

# **EUROPA-UNIVERSITÄT VIADRINA FRANKFURT (ODER)**



**Discussion Paper Series  
in International Economics**


**Discussion Paper No. 01**

## **B|Orders in Motion: Asymmetric Effects of EU Tariffs on Chinese Electric Vehicles**

**Prof. Dr. Martin Kaloudis (Stuttgart)  
Prof. Dr. Georg Stadtmann (Frankfurt/Oder)  
Thorsten Zippan (Frankfurt/Oder)**


**July 2026**

Trade policy measures are regaining importance amid geopolitical tensions and the increasing fragmentation of the global economy. The European Union's imposition of countervailing duties on electric vehicles from China illustrates that borders do not hold the same economic significance for all economies. The established *"B|Orders in Motion"* approach provides a suitable theoretical framework for analyzing borders as dynamic institutions. This paper applies the approach to international trade and extends it with the assumption that the economic impact of a border depends on the structure of the affected economy. Using the example of European trade policy toward China, this paper demonstrates why the same trade policy border leads to differing economic interests and political positions within the European Union. The central finding is that trade policy borders do not necessarily reduce global value creation—they reorganize it: spatially, in terms of market access, and in the distribution among member states.



## 1. Introduction

**B|Orders in Motion** is an interdisciplinary analytical framework that understands borders not only as geographical dividing lines but also takes temporal and social borders into account (see Schiffauer et al. 2018); for an overview of border research, see Gerst et al. 2021. The focus is **on three states of borders (Fig. 1)**. The first state, durability, describes how borders emerge, persist, change, or dissolve, and what effects these processes have on the existing order. Permeability deals with the permeability of borders and examines which people, goods, or information are permitted to cross borders and how these crossings are regulated. Finally, liminality refers to transitional and intermediate spaces where borders become blurred and new orders as well as new forms of coexistence can emerge.



*Figure1 : States of Borders: Durability, Permeability, Liminality*

At the same time, the concept distinguishes three types of borders:

- geographical borders, which separate or connect physical spaces,
- temporal boundaries, which describe transitions between the past, present, and future, and
- social boundaries, which structure social affiliations, exclusions, and social mobility.


Combining the three states of boundaries with the three types of boundaries results in an analytical model with nine perspectives, which illustrates that both boundaries and the associated social orders are dynamic and constantly changing.

This approach has already been applied to economic contexts: Benti/Stadtmann (2022) analyze the interactions between the real and virtual economies using the video game *\*Animal Crossing\** as an example, which incorporates real-world economic developments—such as the period of low interest rates or the U.S. presidential election campaign between Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Zippan/Stadtmann (2025) analyze the relationship between real-world soccer and e-soccer, in which clubs in the 1st and 2nd Bundesliga are required, following a bylaw change by the DFL, to maintain their own esports team and participate in the Virtual Bundesliga.

Both studies demonstrate how developments cross the boundary between the two spheres (permeability) and how liminal transitional spaces emerge in which the two worlds overlap. To date, this framework has not been applied to trade policy boundaries; this is where the present paper comes in: tariffs are interpreted as a change in the permeability of a boundary, and direct investment as a shift in market access strategies through which companies circumvent trade barriers (for a fundamental discussion of “tariff jumping,” see Blonigen 2002).

## **2. Development of Trade Policy Measures Between the EU and China**

In 2024, the European Union imposed countervailing duties on battery-electric vehicles from China. This was based on an antisubsidy investigation by the European Commission, which found that Chinese manufacturers were receiving state support. The additional countervailing duties are determined on a company-specific basis and supplement the regular EU import duty of 10%. Companies such as Tesla, BYD, and SAIC are therefore subject to different duty rates (7.8%, 17%, and 35.3%, respectively), which are based on the extent of government subsidies determined for each company (European Commission 2024).



Note: EU values are total tariff rates (10 % standard tariff + company-specific countervailing duty).

*Figure2 - Import duties on Chinese cars in the EU and the U.S.*

From the perspective of the B|Orders in Motion approach, the EU is thus not changing the permeability of its trade policy border across the board, but rather on a case-by-case basis: The same border is permeable to varying degrees for individual manufacturers. At the turn of the year 2025/2026, however, the European Commission signaled its willingness to allow minimum price agreements (price commitments) in individual cases instead of punitive tariffs (Backovic/Scheer 2026; European Commission 2026; Reuters 2026a). This development illustrates that trade policy measures are not static but can be adjusted through political negotiations.

The possibility of price commitments also changes the economic functioning of the trade policy border. While countervailing duties increase the costs of market access, minimum price agreements continue to allow market access provided that a minimum import price accepted by the European Commission is maintained. This shifts the economic incentives for companies: Instead of paying tariffs or relocating production capacity to the EU (“tariff jumping”), exports from China can continue as long as the minimum price is observed. This can result in higher profit margins for (Chinese) manufacturers, higher consumer prices, and lower tariff revenues for the EU (see García-Herrero/Gros 2026).

The border thus proves to be dynamic in terms of its durability as well: it is established, consolidated, and at the same time continuously modified. There is strong empirical evidence that both instruments—tariffs and price commitments—influence not only prices but also location decisions: Belderbos/Vandenbussche/Veugelers (2004) have already shown, with regard to earlier EU trade conflicts, that foreign manufacturers systematically respond to trade defense measures with direct investment in the target market. The BEV case thus follows an established pattern—what is new is not the mechanism, but its scale.

China responded to the European measures with its own trade countermeasures. These included, among other things, anti-dumping and antisubsidy investigations against European products, as well as measures targeting cognac, pork, and dairy products (Kuhn 2024; SZ/Reuters 2025). The selection of these sectors shows that China is targeting retaliatory measures specifically at economically and politically sensitive areas of individual EU member states.

Noteworthy here is the departure from the historical pattern: Unlike in its dealings with the U.S., China’s anti-dumping practices toward the EU showed no evidence of a systematic “tit-for-tat” approach until 2020 (Lee/Ma/Xu 2025). The close temporal and sectoral linkage of the current measures to the EU’s countervailing duties thus points to a new quality in the border dynamics between the two economic regions. Trade conflicts are therefore not limited to the original market but can spill over into other economic sectors. China has also challenged the EU’s measures through the WTO dispute settlement process (WTO 2025)—the durability of the new boundary is thus also institutionally contested.




Figure 3 - Chronological sequence of measures taken by the EU and China

Various adaptation strategies are available to companies. One particularly important option is to establish production directly within the European single market. Vehicles produced in the European Union are not subject to the EU's countervailing duties on imports from China. For this reason, several Chinese manufacturers are investing in European production sites. BYD is expected to begin production at its plant in Szeged, Hungary, by the end of 2026 and is already looking for a second production site in Europe (Reuters 2026b). Chery is also moving forward with the development of its production facility in Barcelona, operated jointly with Ebro; following multiple delays, production is scheduled to begin in 2026 (Waldersee/Faus 2026).

This shift in strategy does not have to rely exclusively on building new production capacity. For example, the Chinese manufacturer Xpeng is exploring the acquisition of a European plant affected by overcapacity and is in talks with Volkswagen regarding this (Nilsson 2026). Conversely, Volkswagen is considering selling models developed in China in Europe in the future and, in the long term, also producing them at German plants (Backovic 2026). This reorganization thus reaches a new level: the categories "European," and "Chinese" are no longer intertwined solely at the product level, but increasingly also at the level of industrial value creation.

From a corporate perspective, shifting value creation to the target market offers an alternative to cross-border trade in goods. This shift in approach can be achieved through direct investment, the acquisition of existing production sites, or industrial partnerships. Instead of exporting goods across a customs border, value creation is organized entirely or partially within the target market. This changes not only the organization of global value chains but also the economic significance of trade policy borders. The shift in the mode of market servicing thus moves not the goods but the value creation across the border.

While tariffs restrict cross-border trade in goods, direct investment enables production within the customs border. Borders thus not only influence trade flows but also alter the spatial organization of international value chains.

Kratz et al. (2026) show that Chinese direct investment in the EU and the United Kingdom rose to 16.8 billion euros in 2025 (+67% compared to 2024), reaching a 7-year high. The automotive sector remained the most important area of investment; with 93% of investments concentrated in the electric mobility value chain. This development underscores the growing importance of direct investment as a strategy for adapting to changing trade policy conditions. The report also argues that rising trade barriers can

promote direct investment, as companies prefer to relocate production rather than export when trade costs are sufficiently high.

A comparison with the United States shows that the form of reorganization depends on the design of the border: After the U.S. raised tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to 100 percent in May 2024, direct imports from China declined significantly but were replaced by rising EV imports from third countries—trade diversion rather than reshoring (Raul/Ogunsowo/Schaefer 2026). While the calibrated EU border steers the shift toward local production, the prohibitive U.S. border diverts trade flows to third countries.

This is exactly where the B|Orders in Motion approach comes into play.

### **3. Impact on the Various EU Member States**

The differing positions of EU member states on countervailing duties can be explained primarily by their economic structures. France views the duties as an appropriate tool to protect its domestic automotive industry from growing competition from Chinese manufacturers. Germany takes a much more critical view of the same measure, as its export-oriented industry is highly dependent on the Chinese market and fears Chinese retaliatory measures (see Kaiser et al. 2026). Thus, a uniform trade policy measure within the EU leads to differing national interests. Although the trade policy boundary is identical for all member states, it produces asymmetric economic effects due to their differing economic structures. It is precisely this variation in economic impact that explains the divergent trade policy positions within the EU.

For Denmark, the situation is even more distinct: The country has a high share of electric vehicles among new registrations—in 2024, 51.3% of new registrations were battery-electric, the second-highest figure in Europe after Norway (87.9%) and the highest among EU member states, as well as nearly four times Germany's share of 13.5%; In 2025, the share rose to 68.5% (Federal Statistical Office, 2026; Mobility Denmark, 2026)—but Denmark has no domestic automobile production that would need to be protected by tariffs.

Therefore, from a Danish perspective, the negative effects predominate: Higher import tariffs make Chinese electric vehicles more expensive, reduce consumer surplus, and may slow the transition to electric mobility (Krag-Svendsen 2024). At the same time, Denmark is affected by Chinese retaliatory measures. In August 2024, China launched

anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations against European dairy products, exposing the Danish dairy industry in particular to additional uncertainties in its key export market. While tariffs of up to 42.7% were initially threatened, rates ranging from 9.5% to 11.7% have been in effect since February 2026 (Løvstrup 2026). This creates economic burdens for Denmark on both the import and export sides. Denmark is thus affected by the same border shift in two ways: EU countervailing duties reduce the permeability of the European import border and make imports of Chinese electric vehicles more expensive, while Chinese retaliatory tariffs reduce the permeability of the Chinese trade border and limit the export opportunities of the Danish dairy industry. Nevertheless, the example of BYD shows that lower border permeability does not preclude market success. Despite the tariffs, the company was able to significantly increase its sales in Denmark by 39% in the first half of 2026 compared to the first half of 2025 (Mobility Denmark, 2026).

Spain takes a more nuanced stance on the EU's countervailing duties. While the Spanish government generally supports fair competitive conditions in international trade, it also advocates for constructive dialogue with China and warns against further escalation of the trade conflict (see Hale et al. 2024). A key reason for this lies in the expectation of additional Chinese direct investment in the Spanish automotive industry. Chinese manufacturers are increasingly investing in production facilities in Spain, which can create jobs and support the industrial transition toward electric mobility. At the same time, Spain's economic structure differs from that of Germany or France. Although Spain has a significant automotive production sector, it does not have its own national automaker whose market position would be directly threatened by Chinese competition. Instead, the Spanish government pursues a strategy of "conditional openness," in which Chinese investments are expressly welcomed provided they contribute to job creation, the development of local value added, and technology transfer (see Khan, 2026). This reverses the historical division of roles: Spain is applying to China the very policy of conditional market opening—market access in exchange for local value creation, employment, and technology transfer—that China itself has practiced toward foreign investors since the 1990s.

Although the trade policy boundary with China is formally the same for all EU member states, it is assessed very differently within the EU. The differing positions reflect the fact that the member states do not have a homogeneous economic structure, but rather prioritize their respective national industrial, export, investment, and consumer interests.

#### **4. From the Customs Border to the Digital Border: Data Flows in Connected Vehicles**

While the discussion so far has focused exclusively on physical flows of goods, digital technologies are fundamentally changing the nature of trade policy borders. Thus far, this article has treated (electric) vehicles as physical goods crossing a customs border. This perspective can be expanded to include data. A modern vehicle is a rolling computer: it receives updates via cellular networks, transmits sensor, location, and usage data to the manufacturer's servers, and continuously uses mapping and charging services—whether it is an internal combustion engine vehicle, a hybrid, or an electric car. The digital border thus cuts across the product categories covered by EU countervailing duties. The vehicle crosses the customs border exactly once; its data streams, however, continuously cross national borders in both directions. This article therefore proposes considering a digital border in addition to spatial, temporal, and social borders (Schiffauer et al. 2018). Digital borders differ from traditional trade borders in that their permeability is determined not only by legal requirements but also by technical infrastructures and software architectures (Pierucci, 2025). It is well documented that states draw borders in cyberspace (Lambach 2020). What is new is classifying these processes according to the three boundary states of durability, permeability, and liminality.

A look at China, the EU, and the U.S. reveals how differently states shape these borders. Since October 2021, China has required that vehicle data classified as “important” be stored domestically; its export requires an official security review, and general export regulations apply to personal data (CAC 2021). Tesla subsequently established a data center in Shanghai (Moss 2021), and a guideline from February 2026 specifies that this may explicitly include development source code and training data for automated driving (Bigg/Ge 2026). The digital border thus remains permeable

here, but the state determines the conditions of passage—legal literature early on spoke of the return of non-tariff trade barriers in the form of firewalls (Chander/Lê 2015). With the Data Act adopted in 2023, the EU does not rely on the country of origin principle but, since September 2025, has been regulating access to the data of connected products horizontally and with tiered obligations (European Union 2023).

The United States is taking this approach even further. A regulation enacted in January 2025 prohibits the import and sale of hardware and software for vehicle connectivity and automated driving if supplied by companies under Chinese or Russian jurisdiction—for passenger cars of any powertrain type, with software bans effective for model year 2027 and hardware bans effective for model year 2030; Affected manufacturers are also prohibited from selling vehicles manufactured in the U.S. (until 2025).

This situation is not unique to the automotive sector: Aaronson and Leblond (2018) demonstrated even before the BEV conflict that the U.S., the EU, and China have developed three distinct “data realms” with fundamentally different governance approaches. The differing rules for connected vehicles are thus not a new phenomenon, but rather continue in the automotive sector what has long been established in data policy: three blocs with their own rules—and without a common set of rules at the WTO level.

As a result, the “tariff jumping” strategy described in Section 2 loses its effectiveness; at the same time, the durability of the border increases, since relocating production no longer facilitates market access. A tariff can be paid or circumvented by producing in the target market, as BYD is preparing to do in Hungary and Chery in Spain with mass production set to begin in late 2026 (Reuters 2026b); the U.S. border, by contrast, has no price and can be crossed only through regulatory authorizations—an approach that the literature describes as “weaponized interdependence” (Farrell/Newman 2019). The paper’s initial thesis is thus expanded: Whether a border can be circumvented also depends on its political rationale. Even the multilateral framework governing the digital border has now begun to shift: The WTO moratorium on tariffs on electronic transmissions, in effect since 1998, expired on March 30, 2026; approximately 70 members are now maintaining the waiver only on a plurilateral basis (WTO 2026). For the first time since 1998, tariffs on electronic transmissions would thus be conceivable, and the digital border would become permeable in terms of price.

At the same time, liminal spaces are emerging. A BYD vehicle manufactured in Hungary in the future will be considered a European product under customs law, but will remain digitally connected to its parent company's systems; whether a car is "European" or "Chinese" is thus also determined at the data level. There is currently no blanket ban in the EU based on country of origin, as there is in the U.S. (Bird & Bird 2026), but initial risk-based measures are beginning to emerge (Williams 2026). Politically, this debate is framed by the concept of digital sovereignty—the claim by states to assert or regain control over digital infrastructures, technologies, and data flows (Pohle/Thiel 2020); how this claim can be measured has only begun to be clarified (Kaloudis 2024).

For the EU, this presents an opportunity, because unlike customs borders—which affect member states differently depending on their economic structures—access to vehicle data affects all of them equally—even if national security responsibilities and varying economic relationships with China do not guarantee consensus (Williams 2026).

## 5. Conclusion

**Borders do not have a universal effect—their economic significance is context-dependent.**

*The economic impact of a border is not an inherent property of the border itself, but arises from the interaction between the institutional design of the border and the economic structure of the affected economy; "order" is thus the result of the "border."*

Trade policy borders are regaining importance amid geopolitical tensions and the increasing fragmentation of the global economy. This article applies the B|Orders in Motion approach to international trade and examines the economic effects of the EU's countervailing duties on Chinese electric vehicles. Using the example of the differing positions of Germany, France, Spain, and Denmark, the paper demonstrates that the same trade policy border produces asymmetric economic effects due to differing economic structures. This alters both the organization of global value chains and the economic function of trade policy borders. Trade policy borders thus do not necessarily reduce global value creation—they reorganize it.

This article thus expands the B|Orders in Motion approach in three ways. Economically, it shows that the impact of a border depends not only on its institutional design but also on the economic structure of the affected economy. Conceptually, it introduces a fourth type of border—the digital border—which encompasses not only the movement of goods but also the continuous data flows of networked products. Finally, from a political perspective, it becomes clear that the strategy of circumventing borders through direct investment is effective only against economically motivated borders: digital borders justified on security grounds—such as U.S. restrictions on connected vehicles—cannot be overcome by relocating production.

## Literaturverzeichnis

Aaronson, S. A., Leblond, P. (2018): Another Digital Divide: The Rise of Data Realms and its Implications for the WTO. *Journal of International Economic Law* 21(2), 245–272. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgy019>

Backovic, L. (2026, July 1). *VW prüft Verkauf und Fertigung chinesischer Modelle in Europa*. Handelsblatt.  
<https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/volkswagen-vw-erwaegt-verkauf-und-fertigung-chinesischer-modelle-in-europa/100234995.html>

Backovic, L., & Scheer, O. (2026, February 12). E-Auto Cupra Tavascan wird zum Präzedenzfall. *Handelsblatt*, 22–23.

Benti, B. S., & Stadtmann, G. (2022). B|Orders in motion in the video game industry: An analysis based on Animal Crossing: New Horizons. *Human Behavior and Emerging Technologies*, 2022, Article 4452900.  
<https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/4452900>

Belderbos, R., Vandenbussche, H., Veugelers, R. (2004): Antidumping duties, undertakings, and foreign direct investment in the EU. *European Economic Review* 48(2), 429–453.

Bigg, C., & Ge, A. (2026, February 4). China: New guidance on data transfer and identification of important data in the automotive sector. *DLA Piper Privacy Matters*. Retrieved July 3, 2026, from  
<https://privacymatters.dlapiper.com/2026/02/china-new-guidance-on-data-transfer-and-identification-of-important-data-in-the-automotive-sector/>

Bird & Bird. (2026, February 19). *The China-free automotive myth – what EU law really says*. Retrieved July 4, 2026, from  
<https://www.twobirds.com/en/insights/2026/the-chinafree-automotive-myth-what-eu-law-really-says>

Blonigen, B. A. (2002). Tariff-jumping antidumping duties. *Journal of International Economics*, 57(1), 31–49. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996\(01\)00135-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00135-0)

Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). (2025, January 14). *Commerce finalizes rule to secure connected vehicle supply chains from foreign adversary threats* [Press

release]. Retrieved July 3, 2026, from <https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-finalizes-rule-secure-connected-vehicle-supply-chains-foreign-adversary-threats>

Chander, A., & Lê, U. P. (2015). Data nationalism. *Emory Law Journal*, 64(3), 677–739. <https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol64/iss3/2/>

Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). (2021, August 20). *Several provisions on the management of automobile data security (trial implementation)*. Retrieved July 3, 2026, from [https://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-08/20/c\\_1631049984897667.htm](https://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-08/20/c_1631049984897667.htm)

Europäische Kommission. (2024, October 29). *Durchführungsverordnung (EU) 2024/2754 der Kommission zur Einführung eines endgültigen Ausgleichszolls auf die Einfuhren neuer batteriebetriebener Elektrofahrzeuge für die Personenbeförderung mit Ursprung in der Volksrepublik China*. EUR-Lex. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L\\_202402754](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402754)

Europäische Kommission. (2026, February 9). *Durchführungsbeschluss (EU) 2026/328 der Kommission zur Annahme eines Verpflichtungsangebots im Zusammenhang mit den Antisubventionsmaßnahmen gegenüber den Einfuhren neuer batteriebetriebener Elektrofahrzeuge für die Personenbeförderung mit Ursprung in der Volksrepublik China für die Geltungsdauer der endgültigen Maßnahmen*. EUR-Lex. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L\\_202600328](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202600328)

Europäische Union. (2023, December 22). *Verordnung (EU) 2023/2854 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 13. Dezember 2023 über harmonisierte Vorschriften für einen fairen Datenzugang und eine faire Datennutzung (Datenverordnung)*. Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union.

Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. *International Security*, 44(1), 42–79. [https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\\_a\\_00351](https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351)

García-Herrero, A., & Gros, D. (2026, January 22). *Scant benefits for significant risks: Price undertakings for Chinese electric vehicles entering Europe*. Bruegel. <https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/scant-benefits-significant-risks-price-undertakings-chinese-electric-vehicles-entering>

Gerst, D., Klessmann, M., & Krämer, H. (Eds.). (2021). *Grenzforschung: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*. Nomos. <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845295305>

Gusbeth, S. (2026, January 16). EU nimmt Volkswagen-Modell aus China wohl von Zöllen aus. *Handelsblatt*.

<https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/aussenhandel-eu-nimmt-volkswagen-modell-aus-china-wohl-von-zoellen-aus/100192063.html>

Hale, T., Leahy, J., & Jopson, B. (2024, September 11). Spain's Pedro Sánchez calls on EU to 'reconsider' Chinese EV tariffs. *Financial Times*.

<https://www.ft.com/content/2d071e73-631c-47ad-b1b4-b8e62f05fd4e?syn-25a6b1a6=1>

Kaiser, T., Geiger, K., & Kapalschinski, C. (2026, February 23). China: „Mehr als befremdlich“ – das Problem mit der Peking-Reise des Kanzlers. *WELT*.

<https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/plus699997b742c1e3ae5f4dfe9c/china-mehr-als-befremdlich-das-problem-mit-der-peking-reise-des-kanzlers.html>

Kaloudis, M. (2024). *Europe's future – A model for assessing and increasing digital sovereignty*. Cuvillier Verlag.

Khan, M. (2026, May 4). How Spain mapped a path to growth via Beijing. *The Times*. <https://www.thetimes.com/business/economics/article/how-spain-mapped-a-path-to-growth-via-beijing-gkmwhh2xk>

Krag-Svendsen, M. (2024, June 14). Toldkrig kan detonere skattebombe under el-firmabiler. *Business Danmark*.

<https://businessdanmark.dk/nyheder/artikler/toldkrig-kan-detonere-skattebombe-under-el-firmabiler>

Kratz, A., Zenglein, M. J., Mischer, A., Williams, G., & Meyer, A. (2026). *Chinese investment rises to 7-year high: Chinese FDI in Europe: 2025 update*. Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) & Rhodium Group.

<https://merics.org/en/report/chinese-investment-rises-7-year-high-chinese-fdi-europe-2025-update>

Kuhn, B. (2024, August 30). Europäische Strafzölle auf E-Autos – China kontert sofort. *Focus Online*. [https://www.focus.de/experts/eigentor-der-eu-europaeische-strafzoelle-auf-e-autos-china-kontert-sofort\\_id\\_260265275.html](https://www.focus.de/experts/eigentor-der-eu-europaeische-strafzoelle-auf-e-autos-china-kontert-sofort_id_260265275.html)

Lambach, D. (2020). The territorialization of cyberspace. *International Studies Review*, 22(3), 482–506. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viz022>

Lee, W., Ma, H., Xu, Y. (2025): Tit-for-tat in antidumping: How did China fight its antidumping wars with its trading partners? *Journal of Comparative Economics* 53(1), 165–181.

- Løvstrup, M. (2026, February 4). Kina nedjusterer toldtrussel mod EU's mejeriprodukter. *Mejeri Medier*. <https://mejerimedier.dk/nyhed/kina-nedjusterer-toldtrussel-mod-eus-mejeriprodukter/>
- Mobility Denmark. (2026). *Nyregistreringer*. <https://mobility.dk/nyregistreringer/>
- Moss, T. (2021, May 26). Tesla to store China data locally in new data center. *The Wall Street Journal*.
- Nilsson, P. (2026, May 14). *Xpeng in talks with VW about buying a factory in Europe*. Financial Times. <https://www.ft.com/content/c2586266-b18d-49c2-99b6-e151eec312f1>
- Pierucci, F. (2025): Sovereignty in the Digital Era: Rethinking Territoriality and Governance in Cyberspace. *Digital Society* 4, Art. 27. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s44206-025-00189-4>
- Pohle, J., & Thiel, T. (2020). Digital sovereignty. *Internet Policy Review*, 9(4). <https://doi.org/10.14763/2020.4.1532>
- Raul, N., Ogunsowo, O., Schaefer, K. A. (2026): Impacts of U.S. tariffs on electric vehicle imports from China. *Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association* 5(1), 35–45. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jaa2.70036>
- Reuters. (2026a, January 12). *EU to issue guidelines on Chinese EV minimum price plans, China says*. Retrieved February 20, 2026, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-issue-guidelines-chinese-ev-minimum-price-plans-china-says-2026-01-12/>
- Reuters. (2026b, June 9). *BYD Hungary plant to start production in late 2026, executive says*. Retrieved July 5, 2026, from <https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/byd-hungary-plant-start-production-late-2026-executive-says-2026-06-09/>
- Schiffauer, W., Koch, J., Reckwitz, A., Schoor, K., & Krämer, H. (2018). *Borders in motion: Durabilität, Permeabilität, Liminalität* (Working Paper Series B/ORDERS IN MOTION No. 1). Europa-Universität Viadrina. <https://doi.org/10.11584/B-ORDERS.1>
- Statistisches Bundesamt. (2026). *Europa: Neuzulassungen von Personenkraftwagen mit Elektroantrieb*. [https://www.destatis.de/Europa/DE/Thema/Verkehr/E\\_PKW\\_Neuzulassungen.html](https://www.destatis.de/Europa/DE/Thema/Verkehr/E_PKW_Neuzulassungen.html)
- SZ/Reuters. (2025, December 22). China verhängt Strafzölle auf EU-Milchprodukte. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/china-strafzoelle-eu-milchprodukte-dienstag-li.3358361>

Waldersee, V., & Faus, J. (2026, February 6). Chery to start production in Spain this year after delays. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/chery-start-production-spain-this-year-after-delays-2026-02-06/>

Williams, G. (2026, April 1). *Don't stop me now: Chinese cars are having a good time in Europe* [Note]. Rhodium Group. Retrieved July 4, 2026, from <https://rhg.com/research/dont-stop-me-now-chinese-cars-are-having-a-good-time-in-europe/>

World Trade Organization (WTO). (2025). *DS630: European Union — Definitive Countervailing Duties on New Battery Electric Vehicles from China*. Retrieved February 20, 2026, from [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/dispu\\_e/cases\\_e/ds630\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds630_e.htm)

World Trade Organization (WTO). (2026). *Work programme on electronic commerce – Moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions*. Retrieved July 5, 2026, from [https://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/ecom\\_e/ecom\\_work\\_programme\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/ecom_work_programme_e.htm)

Zippan, T., & Stadtmann, G. (2025). B/Orders in motion: Football versus eFootball in Germany. *Journal of Electronic Gaming and Esports*, 3(1). <https://doi.org/10.1123/jege.2024-0064>