Competition and Security of Supply: Let Russia Buy into the European Gas Market!

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Abstract:
We propose a model of the European gas market where the risk that Russian deliveries are interrupted is endogenized. While Russia’s attempts to buy considerable parts of the European downstream industry have faced strong political opposition, we argue that Russian participation in the downstream market would decrease consumer prices and increase the security of supply.

JEL:
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I. Introduction

Russia has become the largest supplier of the European gas market and, as it the largest reserves, its market shares certainly will not decrease for many years. This dependence on Russia is worrying, even more so since, for four days in January 2006, it partly halted its deliveries to Western Europe in order to discipline the transit country Ukraine and enforce higher prices for its gas supplied to Ukraine.¹

On the other hand, Russia’s (Gazprom’s) tremendous profits, based on the oil and gas price increases in the last few years, allows it to invest in the downstream sector in Western Europe. Gazprom’s attempts, however, to buy into the European Gas Industry have encountered strong political opposition. So its shares in the European gas industry are rather restricted (see Table 1). But why be afraid? Why shouldn’t Gazprom become one of the major European pipelines, comparable with Ruhrgas (E.ON) or GdF? In this paper, we will argue that competition as well as security of supply can be improved.

We need not assume that Gazprom is an additional player in the European gas market; it is sufficient to assume that it substitutes (buys) one of the existing European players (or some of the national pipelines). The reason for the increased competition is that the producer Gazprom will deliver according to its marginal costs while the pure traders will deliver according to the price in the upstream market. A trader Gazprom will (partially or totally) avoid double marginalization. Security of supply is increased because of two components, one “inside” our model and one “outside”. The outside argument is that Gazprom’s affiliates are under Western legislation; illegal practices in Europe or even hostile measures by the producer Gazprom are no longer without an effective reply as its property in Europe is effectively held hostage. From inside the model the argument is a bit more complex. So let us first outline the model we have in mind.

Our model of the European gas market has the following properties. In the first stage, the producers $P_j$ determine their capacities $x_j, j = 1, ..., m$, and $j = R = Gazprom$. Then the traders $T_i, i = 1, ..., n$ compete for these capacities as “price takers”. If $i = R = Gazprom$ is also a trader, it does not compete for these capacities but will be served by extra capacities which Gazprom has reserved for its trader. Therefore $T_R$ takes into account Gazprom’s expected marginal costs $c_R$. The traders form tight oligopolies on each regional (downstream) market, but in their (upstream) supply market there are “many” of them compared with the “few” producers. Admittedly, this is a strong simplification which allocates “market power” mainly to the producers. A “price taking” trader offers quantities in the downstream market as if the price in its supply market were fixed, i.e. while acting strategically in the downstream market they act non-strategically in the upstream market. The reason for this, the multiplicity of regional markets, is not modelled explicitly. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is one downstream market with atomistic demand. Note that this

¹ This was not the first interruption because of problems with a transit country. In February 2004, the pipeline via Belarus was closed for one day.
downstream market is a wholesale market with the pipelines on one side and retailers and large industrial customers on the other.

Producers and traders sign long-term Take or Pay (ToP) contracts. Producer $j$ is obliged to supply trader $i$ with a certain quantity $x_{ji}$ for which $i$ is obliged to pay $p_{xi}$ whether or not he takes it. There are additional provisions, in particular an oil and/or coal price dependency of $p$, the opportunity to buy certain limited additional quantities at an increased price, and perhaps fines in the case of non-delivery (depending somewhat on whether non-delivery is caused by "force majeur"). Limited renegotiations are possible in cases of fundamental market disruptions. It is well-known that ToP contracts have such clauses but details are not available. In the following we want to concentrate on long-term contracts between producers and traders with a given price. The problem of non-delivery is simplified and attributed to Russia only.

Non-delivery may have technical reasons. It may be due to terrorist attacks on the pipelines or production facilities, or it may be caused by quarrels arising from contract interpretation between the producer and the trader or with transit countries as in the case of Ukraine. For the time being Russia is the most dependent on transit through third countries' territories and is, of all producers, most endangered by terrorist attacks. Therefore we disregard the risk of non-delivery for all other producers and concentrate solely on Russia. We assume that there is an endogenously determined probability $\alpha$ that Russia will not deliver. This will lead to a reduction in price of Russian gas.

In order to determine $\alpha$ we interpret all the above mentioned risks as (random) additional costs for Russian deliveries. In every case, Russia decides whether to deliver under such increased costs. In the model, we use as a criterium for interruption of delivery whether costs are above the price of Russian gas. We could, of course, argue that Russia’s critical costs may be below this price (reputation as a tough negotiator with transit countries) or above this price (reputation for security of supply). Our assumption seems to be the reasonable compromise if one does not want to model such considerations explicitly. We will see that the result of Gazprom’s entrance as a trader in the downstream market is that – in the long-run – Gazprom will no longer sell quantities in the upstream market but distribute its gas solely via its trade arm. The price $q$ in the downstream market will decrease. As $q > p_R$ = price of Russian gas when Gazprom is not a trader, competition as well as security of supply would increase.\(^2\)

In the next section, in order to show that we are not talking about hypothetical goals, we report about Russia’s (often unsuccessful) attempts to buy into the European downstream market. In Section III we will set up the model. In the fourth section the determination of $\alpha$ will be described, in the fifth section the supply of the downstream market will be derived, initially only with traders who buy in the upstream market and then also with Gazprom as a trader. In both cases demand functions for quantities in the upstream market will be derived. In the sixth section the equilibrium supply of the producers will be determined. The seventh section will offer some rough estimates which are necessary for the evaluation of the model. The last section is the conclusion where we also report about related literature.

II. Gazprom in the European Downstream Market

A number of attempts were recently undertaken by Gazprom to obtain direct access to desired markets in Europe. This goal is supported by Gazprom’s tremendous profits. From 2005 to 2006 Gazprom’s export earnings increased by 44 percent: from €19.0 billion to €27.3 billion. (Neftegas.ru, 2006). With the recent announcement of a €9 billion rise in its revenue in 2007 (WGI, 2007), the company has even more money for an expansion into European markets.

The large European markets (Italy, Germany, France and the UK) are of supreme priority within Russia’s strategy. When attempting to penetrate these foreign downstream markets, however, Gazprom – different from E.ON or GdF – faces strong political opposition. In Great Britain, Gazprom established a 100% subsidiary in 1999 (Gazprom Marketing and Trading), which owns all the licenses for gas supply to industrial end users. Since then, a slow and gradual takeover policy in the British market can be observed. Gazprom’s interest in buying the UK gas-distribution

\(^2\)But even if $q$ were to decrease below $p_R$ – could this be a disadvantage? Transaction costs left aside, it cannot be worse for Western countries than $q > p_R$ because Western countries could offer compensation to transit countries or Gazprom in order to avoid an interruption.
company Centrica in the first half of 2006 (valued at over €15 billion) was thought to be the most significant step of this policy. Although no concrete bid emerged, the mere possibility caused the British government to immediately undertake defensive actions. UK business law allows the government to intervene in mergers if there is an "exceptional public interest". Finally, an unspecified governmental security consideration blocked the potential takeover of Centrica by Gazprom.

Russia still has openly set the goal to hold 20 percent of the British gas market by 2015. Thus, other acquisition attempts were undertaken. In January 2006, the press reported on Gazprom’s interest in Scottish Power (that is, 5 million customers in Britain), but without any real action to be observed. In June 2006, Gazprom bought the small company Pennine Natural Gas, engaged in retail gas trading to 900 end users (including a few major companies). It also entered into an agreement with Natural Gas Shipping Services Ltd for administering Gazprom’s supply to UK customers (Russia Newswire, 2006).

Gazprom’s penetration of the German downstream sector dates back to 1993 when Wingas – the second largest gas distributor in Germany – was established as a joint venture of Wintershall and Gazprom. Its original capital distribution was 65 percent (Wintershall) and 35 percent (Gazprom). Since 2006, each partner holds 50 percent with a majority of one additional share held by Wintershall. Redistribution of forces took place following an asset swap: Wintershall received a 35-percent stake in Gazprom’s Yuzhno Russkoie gas field in Western Siberia, while Gazprom has increased its share in Wingas (Russ Oil-Gas, 2006). Thus a corporate oriented approach may be the only way Gazprom can gain access to certain European markets in the short run. Gazprom’s deal in July 2006 with another German energy concern – E.ON – may result in the strengthening of its downstream business in Hungary. E.ON gets 25 percent minus one share in the Yuzhno Russkoie field, while Gazprom receives 50 percent minus one share in Hungarian E.ON Foldgaz Storage and Foldgaz Trade and 25 percent plus one share in E.ON Hungaria (Russ Oil-Gas, 2006). This swap is still subject to approval by regulators.

As of September 2006, Italian Eni and Gazprom have been discussing a strategic partnership envisaged to involve Eni into exploration and production in Russia, in return for Gazprom being allowed to sell gas directly to end users in Italy (EBR, 2006b). These proposals have faced opposition from Italian regulators. Gazprom had already held talks to acquire two of Eni’s sales subsidiaries (Snam Rete Gas and EniPower), but in vain. Gazprom was successful, however, in the Italian retail sector in November 2006, by signing a collaboration deal with the supplier Gas Plus intended to facilitate the distribution of Russian gas in Italy (EBR, 2006a).

In Portugal, Gazprom is relying upon an investment strategy. In November 2006 it acquired a stake in a holding company that owns 31.6 percent in Galp Energia, the Portuguese corporation with a strong presence in gas distribution across the Iberian Peninsula. Gazprom’s French strategy stands in sharp contrast to this. Despite a long-standing relationship with GdF, it has stated that it will compete directly for French customers. No details have emerged (ERB, 2006a). In 2004, Gazprom did not succeed in a public tender in Romania for the acquisition of 51 percent the two regional gas distributors, Distrigaz Nord and Distrigaz Sud (Ionesen, 2004).

All this shows how large Gazprom’s interest is to expand downstream. In this paper, we argue that such an expansion is also in the best interest of Europe – even without taking into account Russia’s alternatives if it were to be prevented entering the European downstream market. Europe’s interest in security of supply is not stronger than Russia’s interest in “security of demand”, which could be ensured by a stake in the European downstream market. Currently, Gazprom is seeking new markets – North America and China.

III. The model

We have producers $P_1, \ldots, P_m$ and $P_R = \text{Gazprom}$. Producers’ marginal (long term) production costs $c_1, \ldots, c_m$, are constant. Russia, however, may bear additional costs. The reason is that there is, for example, the possibility of a quarrel about transition fees between Gazprom and a transit country. Say, the transit country demands a certain fee, expressed as a share of the gas transported, and, when negotiations fail, simply takes this part. Russia’s reaction may be further negotiations, sanctions of all

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3 Centrica, as UK’s largest gas supplier, has market shares of 60 percent in the household sector and 15 percent in the market for industrial and commercial customers.

4 Only 25 percent of those stocks have voting rights.
kinds or, as ultima ratio, no longer feeding gas into the respective pipeline. Whether Russia adopts this ultimate measure will certainly depend on the respective costs of continued delivery and interruption of supply. So Gazprom’s costs of delivery $c_R$ are a random variable, the value of which is determined only after all contracts have been concluded. In the last stage of our game (the third stage), after $c_R$ is determined by chance, Gazprom decides whether to deliver. Viewed from earlier stages, there is only a probability $\alpha$ that deliveries are interrupted. For the sake of simplicity, this interruption is assumed to be a full interruption.

One may argue that a transit country would take into account decreased or increased criteria of interruption by decreasing or increasing its demands. This may be true but it would not completely offset the derived effects. For the sake of simplicity, we do not include the transit countries as players in our model.

In the second stage of the game, which describes the downstream market, there are traders $T_1, \ldots, T_n$ and (possibly) $T_R = \text{Gazprom}$. The traders $T_i$ supply quantities $x_i + x^R_i$ and $T_R$ the quantity $x^R$ to the downstream spot market which is described by a linear (inverse) demand function

$$q = a - bx$$

(1) $q = a - b(x + x^R + x_R)$ or $q = a - bx$ if Gazprom’s deliveries are interrupted,

with $x = \sum_{j=1}^{m} x_j$, $x^R = \sum_{j=1}^{m} x^R_j$ and $x_R = 0$ if Gazprom is not a trader. The traders buy $x_i + x^R_i$ non-strategically under the assumption of given prices ($p$, $p_R$) and sell strategically in the downstream market. Remember that we rationalized these differing attitudes with the fact that there are many regional downstream markets with few competitors, while altogether, the number of traders is large compared to the number of producers.

The traders’ supply in the downstream market determines their demand in the upstream market. This market is described by an oligopoly of producers who are faced with (inverse) demand functions

$$p = f(x, x^R, \alpha)$$

(2) $p = f(x, x^R, \alpha)$

$$p_R = g(x, x^R, \alpha)$$

(3) $p_R = g(x, x^R, \alpha)$

with $x = \sum x^i = \sum x^R_i$, $x^R = \sum x^R_i$, $x^I_j = \text{supply of producer } j \text{ to the upstream market}$, $x^R$ demand of trader $i$ in the upstream market, and $\alpha = \text{probability of Russian interruption of the gas supply}$.

In this first stage of the game, the suppliers determine quantities (capacities) $x^I$.

In the following we want to determine the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game by working backwards from Stage 3 to Stage 1.

IV. Stage 3: Security of supply

After all long-term contracts have been concluded, Gazprom’s costs $c_R$ of delivery are determined. To fix ideas let us assume that production costs in a narrow sense are as expected but that there are random costs connected with transit through countries with which disputes may escalate to the point where these countries unilaterally take as much gas from the pipeline as they claim to be their adequate transition fee. Thus $c_R$ is random and Gazprom has to decide whether to deliver under such conditions or to stop feeding gas into this transition route. For the sake of simplicity we do not model restricted flows after certain pipelines have been closed but assume a complete stop of Russian deliveries. In particular, this means that Gazprom cannot decide to deliver to its own trade arm (if it exists) while interrupting deliveries to all other contract partners. We thus avoid a lengthy discussion on distributed effects and rationing rules.

Gazprom’s profit from delivering gas is

$$G^R = (p_R - c_R)x^R$$

(4) $G^R = (p_R - c_R)x^R$

if it is not a trader and
(5) \[ G^R = (p_R - c_R)x_R + (q - c_R)x_R \]

if it is. So, if Gazprom is not a trader it will deliver gas as long as

(6) \[ c_R < p_R = \tilde{c}_R. \]

If Gazprom is a trader it will deliver as long as

(7) \[ c_R < \frac{p_Rx_R^2 + qx_R}{x_R^2 + x_R} = \tilde{c}_R. \]

In both cases a probability

(8) \[ \alpha = \int f(c_R)dc_R \]

results that gas deliveries from Russia will be interrupted. \( f(c_R) \) is the density of \( c_R \).

Viewed from earlier stages, Gazprom’s expected profit is

(9) \[ EGR = \frac{\tilde{c}_R}{0} G^R f(c_R)dc_R. \]

V. Stage 2: The downstream market

Let us now investigate the downstream market. Note that the traders \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) do not assume that they have influence on prices \( p \), \( p_R \). For them, these prices are only unit costs of the quantities they want to sell in the downstream market. They have rational expectations about the resulting \( \alpha \) but they do not assume that they have influence on \( \alpha \) (i.e. on \( \tilde{c}_R \)) either. Only \( T_R \) decides about \( x_R \) as if he had influence on \( \alpha \). \( T_R \) does not buy in the upstream market; his costs are Gazprom’s marginal costs \( c_R \). The traders sell their gas on a spot market with a price \( q \) determined by (1). In the following, we determine the Cournot equilibrium in the downstream market with \( n \)

traders having costs \( p \) and \( p_R \) when buying their gas and (in the other case) a trader \( T_R \) who has costs \( c_R \).

The traders \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) have ordered quantities \( x_i \) of non-Russian gas and \( x_R^i \) of Russian gas. The latter is delivered only with probability \( 1 - \alpha \). If Gazprom is not a trader this results in profits

(10) \[ G_i = (1-\alpha)\left[ x_i + x_R^i \left( a - bx - bx_R^i \right) - x_i, p - x_R^i, p_R \right] \]

\[ + \alpha [x_i (a - bx) - x_i, p]. \]

The best responses of traders \( i \) are derived from

(11) \[ \frac{\partial G_i}{\partial x_i} = (1-\alpha)\left[ a - b(x + x_R^i) - b(x_i + x_R^i) - p \right] + \alpha [a - bx - bx_i - p] = 0, \]

(12) \[ \frac{\partial G_i}{\partial x_R^i} = (1-\alpha)\left[ a - b(x + x_R^i) - b(x_i + x_R^i) - p_R \right] = 0. \]

By adding up (12) for all \( i \) we get

(13) \[ p_R = a - \frac{n+1}{n} b(x + x_R^i). \]

which will serve as the inverse demand function for Russian gas in the upstream market. By adding up (11) for all \( i \) we get

(14) \[ p = a - \frac{n+1}{n} b(x + (1-\alpha)x_R^i), \]

which describes the inverse demand function of non-Russian gas in the upstream market.\(^6\)

\(^6\) Though \( x \) and \( x_R \) are given and therefore (when Gazprom is not a trader) \( q \) is determined, the traders act as if they could influence \( q \) by the quantities they supply. Keep in mind that there may be many
If Gazprom is a trader we have to substitute in (10) $x^R$ by $x^R + x_R$. Then we can compute the best responses of traders i as in (11) and (12). The best response $x_R$ is determined by maximizing (9) with $G^R$ from (9) and (5) and $\bar{c}_R$ from (7). In order to distinguish the cases, the variables when Gazprom is also a trader are indicated by $p, p_R, \alpha, x, x^R, \bar{c'}_R$ instead of $p, p_R, \alpha, x, x^R, \bar{c}_R$. Taking into account the definition of $\bar{c}_R$, we get

$$\frac{\partial G}{\partial x_i} = a - b(x + x^R + x_R) - bx_R - \bar{c}'_R = 0$$

with

$$\bar{c}'_R = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \int c_R f(c_R) dc_R,$$

the conditional expectation of $c_R$.\(^7\) Note that, when deriving (15), we took into account the influence of $x_R$ on $\alpha$. (15), however, shows that this influence does not play any role except in the determination of $\bar{c}'_R$. Similarly as above we determine the inverse demand functions:

$$p'_R = \frac{a + \bar{c}_R}{2} - \frac{n + 2}{2n} b(x + x^R)$$

$$p = \frac{1 + \alpha}{2} a + \frac{1 - \alpha}{2} \bar{c}_R - \frac{(n + 2)}{2n} \frac{\alpha}{2} bx_R - (1 - \alpha) \frac{n + 2}{2n} bx_R.$$

VI. The upstream market

In this market the producers fix quantities under the assumption that prices result as described by the inverse demand function (14) and (15) or (17) and (18). Producer R’s profit is described by (9), the other producers’ profits are

$$G^j = x^j(p - c^j)$$

if Gazprom is not a trader. Otherwise $p$ is substituted by $p'$. Note that $x$ and $x'$ are the aggregate quantities provided by the producers (except Gazprom) and that all producers take into account their influence on $\alpha$ and $\bar{c}_R$. When differentiating (19) with respect to $x^R$ we have to take into account that $p$ depends on $x$ and $\alpha$ and that the latter depends on $p_R$. So, the best response for $j$ in the case that $R$ is not a trader is given by

$$p - c_j - \frac{n + 1}{n} b(1 + \beta)x_j = 0$$

with $\bar{c}$ from (7) and

$$\beta = -x^R \frac{d\alpha}{dx} = \frac{n + 1}{n} bx^R f(p_s).$$

Adding up (20) for all $j$ results in

$$p - c - \frac{n + 1}{n} b(1 + \beta) \frac{x}{R} = 0$$

With $c = \frac{1}{m} \sum c_j$.

R’s profit in this case is given by (9) and (4), its derivative with respect to $x_R$ implies

$$p_s - \bar{c}_s - \frac{n + 1}{n} bx^S = 0.$$
where $\bar{c}_n$ is defined by (16) with $\bar{c}_n = p_n$.

From (24) and (13) follows

$$\frac{n + 1}{n} bx = \frac{a - \bar{c}_n}{2} - \frac{n + 1}{2n} bx. \tag{24}$$

From (14), (22) and (24) follows the producers' supply when Gazprom is not a trader:

$$\frac{n + 1}{n} bx = \frac{a - c - (a - \bar{c}_n) \frac{1 - \alpha}{2}}{1 + \alpha + \frac{1 + \beta}{m}}. \tag{25}$$

and because of (24)

$$\frac{n + 1}{n} b(x + x^s) = \frac{(a - \bar{c}_n)}{2} + \frac{n + 1}{2n} bx. \tag{26}$$

Interestingly, (13), (14), (25), and (26) show that $p$ and $p_n$ depend on $m$ but not on $n$. The reason is that $n$ influences only the slope of the inverse demand functions with which the producers are confronted.

**Proposition 1:** When Gazprom is a trader it will not be active (in the long run) in the upstream market. It will distribute its gas completely through its trade arm $T_n$.

**Proof:** In the case where $R$ is a trader we get (see Appendix)

$$\frac{dE}{dx} = - \frac{n + 1}{2n} b \cdot x^s - \frac{1}{n} b(x + x^s) \tag{27}$$

with $E^R$ from (5) and (9), $q$, $p_n$ and $x_n$ from (1), (13) and (15). As $\frac{dE^R}{dx} < 0$, we get $x^R = 0$. With $x_n = 0$ we get

$$\bar{c}_n = q = \frac{a + \bar{c}_n}{2} - \frac{bx}{2}. \tag{28}$$

Together with (18), (28) is an implicit function for $q(x)$. The Implicit Function Theorem implies

$$\frac{dq}{dx} = -\frac{(1 - \alpha)b}{2(1 - \alpha) - (q - \bar{c}_n)f(q)}. \tag{29}$$

After these preparatory computations we can determine the equivalent to (23), the aggregate best response conditions in the case where $R$ is a trader. For this purpose we substitute in (20) $p$ with $p^*$ and compute the derivative with respect to $x^j$

$$\frac{dG^j}{dx^j} = p^* - c_j + x^j \frac{dp^*}{dx} = 0. \tag{30}$$

Adding up (30) for all $j$ yields

$$\frac{dp^*}{dx} = \frac{c + \frac{x^*}{m} \frac{dp^*}{dx}}{0}. \tag{31}$$

From (19) we get

$$\frac{dp}{dx} = -(\frac{\alpha}{2} + \frac{n + 2}{2n} + \beta)b. \tag{32}$$

$$\beta = f(q) \frac{1}{2b} \frac{dq}{dx} (a - bx + q') \tag{33} = f(q) \frac{1}{2b} \frac{dq}{dx} \frac{(a - bx + q')(1 - \alpha)}{4(1 - \alpha) - 2(\bar{c}_n - q')f(q')}$$

From (31), (32), and (19) follows
\( \frac{a - c - \frac{1 - \alpha'}{2} (a - c^0)}{n + 2 + \alpha'} \) \( \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{m}} + \beta \) \( \frac{m + 2}{n} \) and because of (15) with \( x^0 = 0 \)

\[
 b(x + x_0) = \frac{a - c^0 + bx'}{2}.
\]

Proposition 2: If \( \alpha = c^0 \) and if \( \alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta' \) are small enough, then the total quantity supplied to the downstream market increases when Gazprom becomes a trader. The market price \( q \) decreases and the security of supply \( 1 - \alpha \) increases.

Proof:

If \( \alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta' \) are small enough then \( \tau^\alpha = \tau^\alpha' = c^0 = c \). Setting, in addition, \( \alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta' \) equal to 0, (26) and (35) imply

\[
 \frac{n + 1}{n} \frac{b(x + x^*)}{b(x + x_0)} = \frac{(a - c) \frac{m + 1}{m + 2}}{\frac{m + 2}{n} (a - c) \left( \frac{m + 1}{m + 2} + \frac{nm}{2n + 2} \right)} < 1.
\]

So \( q' < q \). Because of

\[
 \frac{n + 1}{n} \frac{b(x + x^*)}{b(x + x_0)} > 1
\]

we get \( p_t < q' \) and so \( \alpha > \alpha' \). ■

Proposition 2 contains an important message but it is not completely new and it does not describe the case we are most interested in. In a hierarchy of monopolies or oligopolies consumers will be better off after partial (in this case) or complete vertical integration (Sprengler, 1950, Abiru, 1988). What is the result, however, if \( \alpha, \alpha', \beta, \beta' \) are not negligible? In principle, (26) and (35) give us the answer, but the result depends on \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) as well as on the demand and cost parameters. In the next section we will calibrate our model and will thus be able to make some guesses.

VII. Calibration and evaluation of cases

Russia has been delivering gas to Western Europe for 30 years. Only for one day in 2004 and for four days in January 2006, part of its supply was stopped. These periods were too short to cause any shortages. Better, let us ask what the probability of an interruption for a period of, say, two months or longer could be. On the basis of 30 years experience with Russian deliveries, this probability would be practically zero. But times have changed and we have to expect a number of conflicts with transit countries who are also recipients of Russian gas and who are now expected to pay Western prices, the earlier the better. While this paper was written negotiations between Gazprom and Belarus ended with a compromise – the threat of an interruption of gas deliveries was explicitly mentioned, however, and in addition, it is not clear whether Belarus will be able to pay the compromise price. Only one week after this compromise was concluded, a quarrel concerning Russian transit fees for oil began.

So, an \( \alpha \) larger than zero seems to be appropriate. In our simple model, \( \alpha \) does not depend on the length of the period, but rather must be reinterpreted in every case. For a period of, say, two months \( \alpha \) is the probability of a complete shut-down. For a period of say, five years it is the share of (longer) interruptions. Let us view Gazprom’s situation as intermediate between the old secure regime and a completely insecure situation as, for example, pipeline transport in Iraq. Perhaps a bit exaggerated guess is \( \alpha = \text{current probability (share) of interruption} = 0.05 \).

In the insurance business the distribution of damage claims is often described by an exponential distribution; if Gazprom’s "damage" is its additional costs, we have

\[
 C_t = C_t^0 + \varepsilon,
\]

\[
 f(\varepsilon) = \lambda e^{-\lambda \varepsilon}, \lambda > 0,
\]
with \( f \) describing the density of \( \varepsilon \).

\[
\alpha = \text{Prob}(C^0_R + \varepsilon > C_g) = 0.05
\]

means

\[
\int_{c_g - \varepsilon}^{\infty} \lambda e^{-\lambda x} d\varepsilon = -e^{-\lambda c_g} \bigg|_{c_g - \varepsilon}^{\infty} = 0.05,
\]

\[
\lambda = \frac{\ln 20}{C_x - C_g},
\]

Presently, Russia sells its gas at about \( p_R = 200 \text{ Euro/1000 m}^3 \) or 2.3 cent/kwh (price at the German border) to several importing pipelines. \( C^0_R \) is about 0.7 cent/kwh\(^8\). We identify the present \( C_R \) with \( p_R = 2.3 \text{ cent/kwh} \) (Russia isn’t a trader). Thus (39) implies

\[
\lambda = \frac{\ln 20}{1.6 \text{ cent/kwh}} = 1.88 \text{ kwh/cent}.
\]

There are no really reliable estimates of gas demand. Liu (2004) finds long run price elasticities for natural gas between -0.78 and +0.08 for OECD countries. Holz et al. (2006) use an elasticity of -0.7 and Sagen and Tsygankowa (2006) use -0.5 in their respective models of the European Gas market. Let us take, as a rough estimate, \( \eta = -0.5 \) for the demand of retailers and large industrial consumers. As van Damme (2004) proposes when applying a linear demand model to the Dutch electricity market, “calibrate” our linear demand to the elasticity, i.e. we assume \( a = \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \right) q \) where \( q = 3 \text{ cent/kwh} \) is the current price in the (German) downstream market with retailers and large industrial customers (Pfaffenberger and Gabriel, 2006). So we get \( a = 9 \text{ cent/kwh} \). Note that, as long as costs are linear, we can look at each regional (national) downstream market independently from the others. We can imagine that certain quantities in the upstream market are earmarked for just this downstream market. The other possibility in evaluating the following computations is to assume that \( q = 3 \text{ cent/kwh} \) is the price in the general European downstream market.

For the following computations, we assume that \( a = 9 \text{ cent/kwh} \), that \( c = c_x = 0.7 \text{ cent/kwh} \), and that \( c - c_x \) is distributed according to an exponential distribution with \( \lambda = 1.88 \text{ kwh/cent} \). From the six equations (8), (13), (16), (21), (24), and (25) we compute the six variables \( b_x^R \), \( b_x \), \( p_R \), \( \alpha \), \( \beta \), \( C_g \) for the case where \( R \) is not a trader. Equivalently, we can determine the respective values for the case where \( R \) is a trader. Note that the two variants of our model need not reproduce the prices and the \( \alpha \) which we have used to determine the demand parameter \( a \) and the distribution parameter \( \lambda \). Our model tries to describe a competitive future environment and not the present state which is characterized by nearly monopolistic retail markets and by downstream markets (in Germany) with close connections between retailers and traders. In spite of this argument and although we did not expect it, Table 2 in the Appendix shows that the current price in the downstream market (~ 3.0 cent/kwh) as well as that in the upstream market (~ 2.3 cent/kwh) is reproduced for \( m = 3 \) (plus Russia) and \( n = 7 \) (the number of importing German pipelines), namely \( q = 3.17 \text{ cent/kwh} \) and \( p_R = 3.01 \text{ cent/kwh} \). We conclude that the downstream market may be more competitive than we thought.

For the future development we concentrate on numbers of producers as well as traders from 1 to 4. The current situation (in Germany as well as some other European countries) may be best described by \( m = 3 \) (plus Russia) while the number of traders is rather different (practically one in France and Denmark and larger numbers in Germany and England). We think, however, that the number of traders in the regional (national) markets will become more homogeneous. Domestic production as well as Dutch deliveries will play an ever smaller role, but new competitors (Algeria, Middle East via LNG) may enter the market. In every case we found improvements with respect to downstream market prices as well as concerning the security of supply (Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix).

---

\(^8\) Production costs depend on the gas field and on the development of transition fees \( C^0_R \). We choose a relative small value based on estimations by Hafner (no date). \( C^0_R \) may as well increase to 0.8 or even 1.0 cent/kwh. This would, however, not affect the qualitative results of our calculations.
VIII. Conclusion

The security of supply has so far been discussed as an exogenous risk which has to be measured (Neumann, 2004; Jansen et al., 2004) and attempted to be handled by market instruments (Egenhofer et al., 2004). On the other hand, there are several models of the European gas market (Golembeck et al., 1995; Sagen and Tsygankova, 2006; Holz et al., 2006), some under explicit consideration of security of supply (Hoel and Strom, 1987; Grais and Zheng, 1996), and others with transit countries as players in the game (von Hirschhausen et al., 2005; Ikonnikova, 2006). However, to the best of our knowledge, no one has tried to evaluate Russia’s attempts to also be a player in the downstream markets or has tried to endogenize the risk of the interruption of Russian deliveries.

Our model is not about diversification of gas supply which, we think, is necessary and should mainly be improved by building LNG terminals. We propose a model of the European gas market which takes into account that Russian deliveries could be interrupted, mainly due to quarrels about gas prices and transit fees with transit countries. Our model is only a rough approximation of the gas market but we think that it is sufficient to derive qualitative results for the cases of when Gazprom is a trader and when it is not. A more sophisticated model would take into account the nature of the Take or Pay contracts which (partly) substitute vertical integration between the producers and the importing pipelines.

The conclusion from our model is that a trader “Gazprom” in the downstream market would decrease the downstream market price heavily and that also the security of supply increases. Europe can only profit if Gazprom invests in the downstream market. For this result it does not matter whether it buys existing traders (n → n – 1) or builds its own trade arm (compare Tables 2 and 3/4). An additional advantage of Russian investment is that European countries are holding Russian property hostage. Unlawful behaviour of Gazprom could be replied by expropriation of its trade arm.

So let Russia buy into the European gas market!

References


Appendix

The derivation of (27)

For the sake of simplicity we omit the primes of the symbols, i.e. we use x instead of x’, etc.

(A1) \( G^R = \int p_R x_R^R + q x_R - c_R \left( x_R^R + x_R \right) \)

with (see (15) and (1))

(A2) \( x_s = \frac{a-c_s}{2} - \frac{x^s + x_a}{2} \)

(A3) \( q = a - b(x + x^s + x_a) \)

Using (1), (15), (17), (18) we get

(A4) \[ \frac{dG^R}{dx^s} = \frac{dp_x}{dx^s} x^s + \frac{dq}{dx^s} x_s + q \cdot \frac{dx_s}{dx^s} - c_s \left( 1 + \frac{dx_s}{dx^s} \right) \]

\[ = -n + \frac{1}{2n} b \cdot x^s + \frac{a + c_s}{2} - n + \frac{2}{2n} b(x + x^s) - \frac{1}{2} bx^s \]

\[ = -\frac{1}{2} \left( a - bx - bx^s - bx_s \right) - \frac{1}{2} c_s \]

\[ = -n + \frac{1}{2n} b \cdot x^s - \frac{1}{n} b(x + x^s) \]
### Table 1: Fully owned firms and joint ventures of Gazprom in Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name of the company</th>
<th>Share of Gazprom, %</th>
<th>Main enterprise in the branch</th>
<th>Partner(s) of Gazprom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Centrex Europe Energy &amp; Gas</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>OMV</td>
<td>OMV (25.1%), Centrex (24.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GWH (Gas- und Warenhandel)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Overgas Inc. AD</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Bulgargaz</td>
<td>Overgas Holding AD (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Ormos</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>RWE Transgas (33%), Austria’s Centrex (33%), E.ON Ruhrgas (33.66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Eesti Gaas</td>
<td>37.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eesti Gaas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Gasum Oy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Fortum</td>
<td>Fortum (31%), Finnish state (24%), E.ON Ruhrgas (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Transgas Oy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FRAGas Trading House</td>
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<td>GdF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Dlouz</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>E.ON Ruhrgas (50%) (holds 6.5% of shares of Gazprom), Wintershall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>5.26</td>
<td>EWE (47.9), VNG Verwaltung und Beteiligung (25.79), Wintershall (15.79), EEGERdgas Transport (5.26)</td>
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<td>ZGG (Zanubechgas-Erdgashandel)</td>
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<td>ENI (Snam Rete Gas)</td>
<td>Edison (51%), ENI (50%)</td>
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<td>Lietuvos Dujos</td>
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<td>Lietuvos Dujos</td>
<td>E.ON Ruhrgas (38.9%), Lithuanian State (17.7%), individuals and legal entities (6.3%)</td>
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<td>Stella Vita</td>
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<td>Gasunie</td>
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### Table 2: Downstream prices q in cent/kwh, Russia’s upstream price p_R and security of supply 1-α for different numbers m of producers (plus Russia) and traders n. Case: Russia is not a trader.

<table>
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<td>n</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>------</td>
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<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.67</td>
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<td>p_R</td>
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<td>1 - α</td>
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<td>0.977</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>0.928</td>
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</table>
**Table 3:** Price differences \( q - q' \) with \( q'(q) \) = downstream price if Russia is (not) a trader.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1</th>
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<td>1.59</td>
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<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.36</td>
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<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.08</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.91</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4:** Differences of security of supply \((1 - \alpha') - (1 - \alpha) = \alpha - \alpha'\) with \(\alpha'(\alpha)\) = probability of interruption if Gazprom is (not) a trader.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1</th>
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<th>4</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.042</td>
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</table>